THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
Governance is the exercise of authority and institutional resources to manage activities in society and the economy. It concerns the public as well as the private sectors, but tends to apply differently depending if public or private interests are at stake. In both cases a significant concern is performance, that is how effectively available resources are used.
Like all sectors of activity, transportation has a unique set of characteristics about its governance as both the public and private sectors are actively involved. For transport terminals many different forms of governance are in place which shape modes of financing, operations, functioning and external relationships. This is particularly important as large terminal infrastructure involved in global flows of passengers and freight are complex, capital intensive and of strategic importance to economic welfare. There are two main components of terminal governance; ownership and operations. Ownership involves who is the owner of the terminal site and facilities (including equipment):
Operations involve the day-to-day management and carrying out of terminal activities:
Public ownership and operations has been important in many modes because of the strategic importance of transport and the long term investments required that the private sector may be incapable or unwilling to make. In this way the terminals can be owned and operated as public goods, and can be integrated with public regional and national economic policies. On the other hand, public facilities are seen by some as slow to respond to market conditions, with a propensity to over-invest in non-economic developments, and with high costs to the users.
There is a growing tendency towards privatization in transport as a whole, particularly with deregulation. Transport terminals increasingly became an attractive form of investment for private equity firms seeking valuable assets and a return on their investments. This is manifested in the sale of ports and airports in some countries such as the UK, and in the break-up of state rail monopolies, as in the EU. Privatization is most evident, however, in the awarding of operational concessions to private companies. The trend towards concessions is warranted in part by the belief that the private sector is more efficient than the public in operating terminals, and that this form of governance keeps the ownership still under public control. It is also seen as a mean of reducing public expenditures at a time when states are becoming less willing (or able) to make large investments. Thus, the setting of public / private partnerships is seen as a dominant trend in the governance of transport terminals.
Even as late as the 1980s, ports around the world were amongst the types of terminal most dominated by public ownerships and operation. While the forms of port governance differed greatly, from the municipally-owned ports in Northern Europe and the US, to the state owned ports in France, Italy and much of the developing world, public ownership was dominant and publicly managed port operations were prevalent. This contrasted with the shipping industry, where private ownership was almost universal. The development of containerization particularly underlined how operationally deficient public port authorities were to growing time and performance requirements intermodalism imposed on transport chains. The changes, slow at first, came from two directions:
These developments helped create what has become a global snowball of port reform, commonly known as port devolution since the public sector was relinquishing its role from a function it formerly assumed. It made governments around the world more open to considering reforming port governance and offering better conditions to ensure privatization. The growing demands for public and private investment in ports, precipitated by the growth in world trade, and the limited abilities of governments to meet these needs because of competing investment priorities, were key factors. Thus, while few were willing to go as far as the UK in the total privatization of ports, many countries were willing to consider awarding concessions as an intermediate form of privatization. The result has been an almost global trend towards the award of port operational concessions, especially for container terminals.
If the opportunities to award operational concessions can be seen as an increase in demand, growth has also been greatly affected by an increase in the supply of companies seeking concessions. In Northern Europe and the US many ports had already operated through concessions, awarded to local terminal handling companies. Because they were relatively small and locally-based with only few exceptions, they did not participate in the global growth of opportunities for concession awards. The exceptions were Stevedore Services of America (SSA) that was already active in several US West Coast Ports, that obtained concessions to operate facilities in Panama and several other smaller ports in Central America, and Eurogate, a joint company formed by terminal handling companies from Bremen and Hamburg, that obtained concessions in Italy.
Over a short period a few companies were able to become major global terminal operators controlled a multinational portfolio of terminal assets. They mostly came from Asia with four large companies dominating, three coming from a stevedores background and one from a shipping line:
HPH, which originated as a terminal operator in Hong Kong, first purchased Felixestowe, the largest UK container port, and today has a portfolio of 51 terminals around the world, including in Rotterdam and Shanghai. PSA has been active securing concessions in China and Europe, including Antwerp. These two terminal operators take their origin from globally oriented ports offering limited local terminal expansion opportunities. The local operators were thus incited to manage the constrained assets efficiently and to look abroad for expansion opportunities. DW has grown through purchases, such as P&O Ports and CSX World Terminals, and by securing concessions elsewhere.
Shipping lines have also participated in terminal concessions, but to a lesser extent. The most important is the in-house terminal operating company of Maersk, APM Terminals. In addition, Evergreen, COSCO, MSC, NYK, and CMA-CGM hold port terminal leases. Between the dedicated terminal operating companies and the shipping lines, a global pattern of concessions is evident.
The rapid expansion of terminal operating companies reflects two economic forces. First, the entry of former terminal operators into the global system represents a process of horizontal integration, in which the companies, constrained by the limits of their own ports, seek to apply their expertise in new markets and seek new sources of income. Second, the entry of shipping lines into terminal operations is an example of vertical integration, in which the companies seek to extend their control over other links in the transport chain. Several other factors explain the growth of global terminal operating companies:
The growth of multi-national terminal operating companies has resulted in a concentration of power. In 2008 the top five global terminal operators accounted for 28% of global container port activity in terms of equity based throughput. What is perhaps most important is that they now dominate at the most important container ports in the world. They are able to wield monopoly power in many parts of the world. The consequences of this power remain to be analyzed, but there is growing evidence of dissatisfaction in many ports about the actions of these companies that possess long term leases. Thus, in Genoa there is concern about the lack of performance of the port since PSA took over the main container terminal. In Antwerp, there are concerns about the imposition of Singapore-based management systems on a European operation. In China there is opposition to HPH and how it is increasing terminal handling costs to enhance profitability, which is seen as undermining China's competitiveness on global markets. On the other hand, there is strong evidence to suggest that port performance has improved in most ports as a result of the award of concessions to international terminal companies. The question will be whether to regulate further concentration of power leaving several maritime ranges having to deal with a limited number of terminal operators in position to impose oligopolistic price settings.
Deregulation, port devolution, the growing role of global terminal operators and the changes imposed by intermodalism and global supply chain management are challenging the role and function of port authorities, or any agency overseeing regional transportation assets. The governance of hinterland access regimes is linked with cluster formation. It refers to the agglomeration effects and the degree of internal cohesion and competition within a hinterland. This governance concept not only applies to ports, but can also be inferred to airports, inland ports and logistical zones, or any freight distribution construct where a closer integration of the involved actors could lead to performance improvements. An emerging paradigm concerns the consideration of the city as a terminal and a hub, which means it acts as a functional freight region. This paradigm is particularly important because:
Cluster governance is a business strategy that relates to the mix of, and relations between, organizations and institutions that foster coordination and pursue projects that improve the cluster as a whole through regional strategies and the coordination of their hinterland. The main advantages of cluster governance are a better access to competencies and innovative ideas, a better access to suppliers and customers, a better access to capital and an overall reduction of transactional costs. Although there is no single cluster governance model, as each port (or terminal) region has a different set of geographical, economic, regulatory and operational characteristics, the following four issues tend to be common to all clusters:
The full implications of cluster governance remain to be assessed, particularly to what extent they generate added value to the terminal region and if such strategies are linked with the attraction, or at least the retention of customers and the traffic they generate. There are also impacts on competition within the cluster as firms undertake collaborative strategies aiming at improving their respective efficiencies. It can be expected that a better access to international markets can be achieved, which would indirectly promote the globalization of the companies within the cluster. This also has an impact on competition between clusters over discretionary traffic, namely transshipment.

Transport, Trade and Governance

Transport Terminal Governance: Main Benefits and Problems

Comparison Between European, North American and Pacific Asian Railways

Some Legislations in the Deregulation of Transport in the United
States and Canada

Factors behind the Interest of Equity Firms in Transport Terminals

Public / Private Partnership Options

Public and Private Roles in Port Management

Ownership of European Port Authorities

Main Governance Models for Inland Ports

Conditions for Port Privatization

Forms of Port Terminal Privatization

Typology of Global Port Operators

Top 12 Global Port Operators in Equity-Based Throughput

Number of Terminals and Total Hectares Controlled by the Twelve
Largest Port Holdings

Container Terminal Surface of the World's Major Port Holdings

Container Terminals of the World's Four Major Port Holdings

Container Terminals of the World's Regional Port Holdings

Regional Share in the Terminal Portfolio of the Twelve Largest
Global Terminal Operators

Vertical and Horizontal Integration in Port Development
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Emerging Paradigm in the Role of Port Authorities within their Port
Regions

Strategies Used by Port Authorities to Coordinate their Hinterland